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The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act:
Becoming Conscious of the Need to
Accommodate Conscience
COLLEEN M. GARRITY*
The government exempts conscientious objectors from military service to ensure
that these individuals are not compelled to violate their beliefs through
participation in war. However, to many conscientious objectors using their tax
dollars to fund war is as morally reprehensible as compelling them to participate
in war. This is particularly true given that technology and equipment, purchased
with tax dollars, are the primary resources used to fight wars in the modern
world Despite conscientious objectors' deeply held beliefs, paying taxes is an
inescapable part of American life. This Note advocates the Religious Freedom
Peace Tax Fund Act as a constitutional and practically feasible solution to this
problem. The Act would create a mechanism through which conscientious
objectors' tax dollars would be allocated to fund only non-military programs.
Section II of the Note provides a brief history of conscientious objection in
America and describes the ways in which these beliefs have been accommodated
over time. Section III explains the current state of conscientious objection and
war tax resistance. Section IV sets forth the details of the proposed Religious
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act. Section V demonstrates that the Act is a
constitutionally permissible accommodation under the First Amendment. Section
VI addresses several of the primary criticisms advanced by the Act's opponents.
Finally, Section VII presents the practicalities associated with implementation of
the Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conscientious objectors to tax, unlike other tax protestors, generally accept
the legal legitimacy of the income tax. I However, they contest the moral
legitimacy of allocating a portion of the income tax to military expenses and
argue that requiring them to pay these taxes violates their freedoms. 2 These
concerns are particularly timely in the wake of the war in Iraq and the United
States's continued military involvement in the Middle East and other countries
* J.D., Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2004 (expected). This Note is
dedicated to Geraldine Milam Beaulieu, a woman whose strength and determination continue
to inspire me. I give special thanks to my parents, Thomas and Veronica and my siblings,
Maureen and Patrick, for their unwavering love and support.
I Marjorie E. Komhauser, For God and Country: Taxing Conscience, 1999 Wis. L. REv.
939, 942-43. "Standard tax protesters... refuse to pay tax because they resent having to pay so
much tax, because they opposed the concept of the State in principle, or because they oppose
the particular government. Many are alienated and deny the right of the U.S. government to tax
them on a variety of grounds .... Id at 942-43 (footnote omitted).
2 Id. at 960.
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throughout the world.3 In the modem world, technology and equipment, more so
than manpower, are the primary resources used to fight wars.4 Attaining the most
superior technological advancements requires funding, including funding through
citizens' tax dollars. 5 Just as conscientious objectors argued that they should not
be required to participate in war, many of these individuals argue today that they
should also be exempt from the funding of war.
Conscientious objectors' lives are profoundly affected by their beliefs. They
do not merely dislike or disagree with these laws; 6 rather, they model their
behavior in a manner that enables them to remain true to their beliefs. 7 For
example, many refuse, at great penalty, to pay income taxes or even make a
decision to live below the poverty line in order to avoid tax liability. 8 These
individuals9 and society as a whole suffer as a result of their decisions.10 The
United States cannot function without tax dollars and thus, these individuals'
3 See Dexter Filkins & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Humvee is Bombed on a Baghdad Street,
Killing a Soldier, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A1O (reporting that, despite the fact that
President Bush declared an end to the war in Iraq on May 1, 2003, U.S. occupation of Iraq
continues and the number of American casualties continues to grow); Elaine Sciolino, France
and Germany Consider Possible Roles in Postwar Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 2003, at A1O
(referring to the American military's occupation of Iraq as "open-ended"); Marketplace: Peace
Tax (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://www.Marketplace.org/shows/
2002/09/20_mpp.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
4 Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 131 CONG. REC. S 19,601 (1985)
(statement of Sen. Hatfield) (noting that "[t]echnology now supersedes the foot soldier in
importance; the conscription of dollars precedes the conscription of persons") (quoting Charles
DiSalvo); Steve Oleshewsky, Why We Need the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund (H.R.
1186), THE TOUCHSTONE, Apr./May 2002, at http://www.rtis.com/reg/bcs/pol/touchstone
/apr02/10.HTM (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
5 131 CONG. REC. S 19,601 (1985).
6 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
7 For example, Randy Kehler and Betsy Comer correctly computed and reported their tax
liability to the IRS. See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 941. However, instead of paying the
amount they owed, they sent the IRS a letter explaining why their beliefs prevented them from
funding military programs and activities and placed their tax dollars in a bank account or
contributed the money to organizations that promoted peace and helped the poor. Id. The
couple was severely punished when the IRS subsequently seized and sold their home. Id.
Randy Kehler refused to leave the home and was ultimately sentenced to a six months in prison.
Id.; see also infra Section III (discussing common methods employed by resisters to avoid
funding military endeavors and the penalties assessed against individuals who employ these
methods).
8 See infra Section 111.
9 See infra Section III.
10 See, e.g., Komhauser, supra note 1, at 941-42 (noting that "people who refuse to pay
their taxes for any reason, potentially threaten the viability of the tax system and ultimately the
government itself'); see also infra notes 99, 184-87 (arguing that implementation of the
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund would address these concerns by encouraging resisters to
pay their tax dollars, and thus, would increase the amount of tax dollars generated by the IRS).
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actions deprive the country of resources it needs to ensure its continued existence
and dominance in the world." However, this situation is not hopeless; rather, the
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act 12 would provide a solution to this
problem by accommodating the needs of conscientious objectors while ensuring
economic benefit, in the form of increased tax revenues, to the United States.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the Peace Tax Fund is a
constitutionally permissible and practically feasible concept. Section II provides a
brief history of conscientious objection within the United States and explores the
various ways in which these beliefs have and have not been accommodated over
time. Section III explains the current state of conscientious objection and, more
specifically, war tax resistance. Section IV lays forth the details of the proposed
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act. Section V demonstrates that the Act is a
constitutionally permissive accommodation under the First Amendment. Section
VI presents and responds to some of the primary criticisms advanced by
opponents of the Act. Finally, Section VII highlights the practicalities associated
with implementation of the Fund.
II. HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN AMERICA
The reasoning employed to justify exempting conscientious objectors from
participation in military endeavors is analogous to the reasoning that can be used
to justify creation of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund. It is therefore
important to explore the history of conscientious objection in America in order to
understand the development of this country's accommodation of conscientious
objectors by exempting them from military service. 13
11 When these individuals withhold their tax dollars, less money is available to fund all
government projects, including defense projects. Thus, the resisters' actions have an adverse
impact that reaches beyond defense programs to affect all government programs.
12 The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, H.R. 2037, 108th Cong. (2003), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited October 23, 2003). Despite the inclusion of the word
"Religious" in the title, the Act would enable participation by secular conscientious objectors.
Id. at § 1. The bill proposes to define "conscientious objector" in the same way that the
Selective Service Act defines the term Id. at § 3(a). The Supreme Court extended the ambit of
the Selective Service Act by determining that moral, ethical, and religious beliefs can all serve
as the basis for conscientious objection. See infra notes 50-51.
13 See William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost from the Vietnam War:
Restructuring the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REv. 179, 182
(1993).
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A. Pre-Civil War Accommodation
The concept of religious freedom 14 was extremely important to many of this
country's earliest inhabitants. The desire to attain this freedom was often an
important factor in the decision to immigrate to the United States. 15 Accordingly,
legal provisions were in place during colonial times to protect conscientious
objectors from having to act in ways that would contradict their beliefs.' 6 The
majority of colonial governments enacted legislation that served to protect
conscientious objectors after 1662.17 In 1775, the Continental Congress adopted a
resolution that recognized the right of conscientious objectors, whose anti-war
sentiments were based on religious beliefs, to abstain from service in the state
militias. 18 While the resolution exempted conscientious objectors from military
service, it also encouraged these individuals to "'contribute liberally in this time
of national calamity' and to offer whatever services they were able to perform,
consistent with their religious principles." '19 Thus, from these earliest days,
American forefathers acknowledged that it was possible to accommodate
14 Over time, it has been recognized that the notion of freedom of religion must be
expanded to recognize the freedom of conscience, including the freedom to hold beliefs
founded in morals and ethics in addition to religion. See infra Section H.E. From a historical
standpoint, this freedom of conscience has its beginnings in the notion of freedom of religion,
which is why this portion of the Note refers only to the latter.
15 See Karl D. Nelson, "By Reason of Religious Training and Belief.. "A History of
Conscientious Objection and Religion During the Vietnam War, ch. 1 at 4 (1998) (unpublished
Honors Senior Project, Western Washington University) (on file with author),
http://members.macconnect.com/users/k/knelson/co/co.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
English Quakers and Russian, Dutch, and German Mennonites were among some of the earliest
immigrants to America. Id. "All of these groups, hoping to avoid the persecution of their beliefs
in Europe, were drawn to America by promises of religious freedom." Id. Members of pacifist
groups, including Quakers and Mennonites, traveled to the United States to avoid persecution
for their pacifist beliefs and to avoid being pressured, and in some cases compelled, to serve in
European militaries. See id at 5.
16 See National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, Background to the Peace Tax Fund, at
http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). For example, some of the colonies
accommodated conscientious objectors by exempting them from participation in their militias.
See Palmer, supra note 13, at 182. In contrast, other colonies did not excuse conscientious
objectors from service, but rather, imposed large taxes and fines on those who refused to serve
in militias and, in some extreme cases, imprisoned conscientious objectors who refused service.
Id. However, even in some of these communities, leaders observed that objectors were
productive, law-abiding members of the community and thus acknowledged a need to provide
them with alternatives to service in the militias, including the provision of care for women,
children, and the elderly, and supervision of cattle and other economic goods. See Nelson,
supra note 15, at 6.
17 See Background to the Peace Tax Fund, supra note 16.
18 See Palmer, supra note 13, at 182.
19 Id (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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individuals' consciences in a manner that also left room for the fulfillment of civic
responsibilities. 20
B. Accommodation during the Civil War
Conscription was used for the first time in American history during the Civil
War.21 The large nmbers of casualties during battles necessitated the constant
availability of new soldiers to take their place in the next battles.22 Despite the
need for soldiers, "the 1,200-1,500 conscientious objectors23 were numerically
insignificant." 24 An exemption of these comparatively few individuals was
feasible given that the Union and the Confederacy had amassed armies comprised
of greater than two million soldiers. 25 In addition, government leaders realized
20 In addition, many of the framers of the Constitution acknowledged the need to
accommodate conscientious objectors. A proposed amendment exempting conscientious
objectors from military service was discussed during the debates over the Bill of Rights. See
Nelson, supra note 15, at 7. The proposal was approved in the House of Representatives;
however, it was subsequently defeated in the Senate. John Whiteclay Chambers II,
Conscientious Objectors and the American State from Colonial Times to the Present, in THE
NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR RESISTANCE 23, 29 (Charles C.
Moskos & John Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993). Scholar Major David M. Brahms has
argu[ed] that:
[James] Madison and other defenders of the [conscientious objector] amendment
assumed that, despite the Senate elimination of a number of specific amendments, the
right of religious conscientious objection would be protected by the first amendment
guaranteeing freedom of religion and the ninth amendment guaranteeing the sanctity
of those nonenumerated rights retained by the people ...
Id. at 29 n.28 (citation omitted).
Despite the bill's defeat in the Senate, sixteen of the states recognized the right to freedom
of conscience in resolutions or in their state constitutions and, in some cases, explicitly provided
for the right to engage in conscientious objection. Id. at 29.
21 See Palmer, supra note 13, at 183; Nelson, supra note 15, at 8.
22 See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 20, at 29.
23 Lillian Schlissel, Preface to Part III, in CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA 91 (Lillian Schlissel
ed., 1968). This figure only includes religious and not secular conscientious objectors because
accommodation of "conscientious objectors" during this time period was only extended to
draftees whose pacifist beliefs were religiously based. See Id.
24 Nelson, supra note 15, at 8 (citing Schlissel, Preface to Part III, in CONSCIENCE IN
AMERICA 91). However, as the war continued and the number of casualties increased, the
Confederacy became increasingly desperate for manpower. See Schlissel, supra note 23, at 90.
Jefferson Davis, who had initially been tolerant of conscientious objectors, realized the need to
draft a larger number of men into combatant service and thus, greatly limited the number of
exemptions granted to conscientious objectors. See id.
25 See Schlissel, supra note 23, at 91. In contrast to fighting in the Civil War-era, which
necessitated large numbers of soldiers, fighting in the modem era is dependant upon technology
and the money, including tax dollars, used to attain technological advancements. See supra note
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that forcing objectors to fight was ineffective because people who are morally
opposed to fighting did not make good soldiers.26 Furthermore, leaders in the
North and South began to "recognize the sincerity and stubbornness 27 of the
pacifist religious objectors" 28 and to understand that these individuals were not
asserting feigned beliefs in an attempt to escape the dangers of combat.29 This
increased understanding actually contributed to greater tolerance of conscientious
objectors by many government officials. 30 In 1864, during the Civil War, the
government made the determination to accommodate conscientious objectors by
exempting them from combatant military service.3 1
4 and accompanying text However, just as conscientious objectors made up a comparatively
small portion of the population of eligible soldiers, those who are conscientiously opposed to
funding military endeavors make up a comparatively small portion of the population of eligible
taxpayers. See infra notes 161-62. In this regard, implementation of the Peace Tax Fund, like
this exemption from combatant service, appears feasible. See infra Section VII.
26 See Nelson, supra note 15, at 9. Similarly, supporters of the Peace Tax Fund assert that
in addition to being to being moral and fair, implementation of the Fund would be efficient
because it would increase the overall amount of tax dollars collected by the IRS, decrease the
funds that the IRS has to allocate to collecting delinquent payments from objectors, and
encourage objectors to earn to their full capacity. See infra Section VII.
27 For example, drafted conscientious objectors, especially those who refused to provide
noncombatant service, were often threatened by their superiors with severe punishments
including imprisonment and death when they refused to comply with orders. Diary of Cyrus
Pringle, The Record of a Quaker Conscience, (1863), in CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA, supra note
23, at 102, 107 (Lillian Schlissel ed., 1968). Many times, the conscientious objectors who faced
these types of ultimatums elected to go to prison rather than violate their beliefs by following
orders. See id. at 104. One such objector, Cyrus Pringle, chose to go to prison rather than violate
his beliefs; and, in making this decision stated "we cannot purchase life at the cost of peace of
soul." Id. at 105. Similarly, many modem war tax resisters are sincere and stubborn in refusing
to stray from their beliefs even if that means they risk having serious penalties imposed against
them; or, alternatively, that they make the decision to earn incomes below the taxable level. See
supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; infra Section 11.
28 Chambers, supra note 20, at 29.
29 See id at 29-30.
30 See Nelson, supra note 15, at 9. President Lincoln, Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War,
and John A. Campbell, Confederate Secretary of War, have been identified as three supporters
of conscientious objection during this time period. See id; Schlissel, supra note 23, at 89. One
historian, John Whiteclay Chambers II, attributes Lincoln's support, at least in part, to the fact
that the majority of conscientious objectors during this time were members of Lincoln's party,
the antislavery Republicans. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 45. Despite these sources of
support, conscientious objectors continued to encounter criticism and even violent reprisal in
the form of torture and execution. See Nelson, supra note 15, at 9.
31 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. XIII, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864). The exemption applied to
"members of religious denominations, who shall by oath or affirmation declare that they are
conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the
rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious denominations...." Id. These
individuals were not exempted from the draft. See Palmer, supra note 13, at 183. However,
upon being drafted they were permitted to provide noncombatant service in the form of hospital
1234 [Vol. 64:1229
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C. Accommodation during World War I
A draft was also instituted during World War 1.32 American leaders initially
adopted a conservative perspective towards conscientious objectors because of
their concerns that many of the war's opponents would take advantage of
exemptions by falsely claiming conscientious objector status.33 However, these
officials ultimately decided to exempt "all [conscientious objectors] who opposed
war in general" 34 from combatant service although they continued the trend of
requiring an alternative means for satisfying civil responsibilities by requiring
objectors to provide noncombatant service. 35 Despite this exemption, many of the
individuals who were conscientiously opposed to war during this time faced
fierce opposition and harsh treatment because of their beliefs.36 As news of this
work or caring for freedmen, or in the alternative, to pay $300 that was used to care for sick and
wounded soldiers and not to fund future battles. See Act of Feb. 24, 1864 § 17, 13. Stat. at 9.
The provision of this exemption and its accompanying alternatives lends credence to the idea
that it is possible to accommodate individuals' consciences in a way that also allows for the
fulfillment of civic responsibilities, a theme that permeates American history. See Section II.A.
The Confederate Forces also exempted certain conscientious objectors from combatant
service, provided that they were able to fumish a substitute soldier to fill their place; or,
alternatively, were able to pay a fixed amount of money. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 30.
32 Nelson, supra note 15, at 10.
33 Chambers, supra note 20, at 32. Section 4 of the Selective Service Act of 1917
restricted conscientious objector status to persons who were members of "any well-recognized
religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or
principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form .. ." Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat.
76, 78 (1917). The policy of the American government during the first year of the war was to
apply this limited exemption, but to pressure exempted individuals to participate in some type
of service within the military. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 33. Newton D. Baker, Secretary
of War during World War I, eventually formed a committee to determine whether the beliefs of
individuals who adamantly refused military service were sincere. See id. at 34. The committee
determined that 95% of these individuals had sincerely held anti-war beliefs. Id
34 Chambers, supra note 20, at 34.
35 See Act of Mar. 18, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917); see also
Palmer, supra note 13, at 183. The Act's exemption was limited to conscientious objectors who
were members of the "peace churches," and thus, objectors whose anti-war beliefs were based
on their religion. Id. However, the ambit of the exemption was ultimately widened in order to
cover persons who had 'personal scruples against war."' See id. at 184 (quoting Selective
Service System, Special Monograph No. 11, Vol. I, CONsCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 29, 55 (1950)).
36 See Chambers, supra note 20, at 33-35. Drafted conscientious objectors, although
exempted from combatant service and relegated to perform noncombatant service, were still
under the control of the military. See id. at 33. Military commanders often applied relentless
pressure on objectors, sometimes in the form of physical pressure, in order to persuade them to
participate in combat. See id. While some American soldiers were tolerant of the conscientious
objectors who provided noncombatant service, others greatly disliked conscientious objectors.
See Nelson, supra note 15, at 11. One officer vocalized his hatred by stating that conscientious
objectors were "'enemies of the Republic ... fakers, and active agents of the enemy."' See id.
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poor treatment became public, many Americans argued that government officials
had failed to ensure conscientious objectors' ability to exercise their beliefs. 37 In
addition, conscientious objectors and their supporters realized the need to band
together to ensure that this poor treatment did not occur during future wars.38
D. Accommodation during World War II
During World War II, conscientious objectors were subjected to "a more
liberal and humane governmental policy" in comparison to, and in part because
of, the poor treatment they received during World War 1.39 The most predominate
feature of this policy was the passage of a draft law that extended conscientious
objector status to all religious objectors40 and allowed conscientious objectors to
Approximately 400 conscientious objectors who absolutely refused participation in any
form of military service were imprisoned during World War I. See Background to the Peace
Tax Fund, supra note 16. In many cases, the harsh treatment did not end with imprisonment.
For example, the bodies of two Mennonite brothers who had died from illness in a federal
prison were sent home to their families dressed in the military uniforms that the men had been
conscientiously opposed to wearing when they were alive. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 35.
In addition, during World War I, exemptions based on conscientious objector status were
only available to members of "historic peace churches." Nelson, supra note 15, at 1. The
Anabaptists, the Brethren, and the Quakers were categorized within this group, unlike
Protestants, Jews, and Roman Catholics. Id. at 2. Consequently, many individuals who were
conscientiously opposed to war were unable to qualify for the exemption because they did not
belong to one of the peace churches.
37 See Chambers, supra note 20, at 35. The repression of conscientious objectors and other
wartime dissenters and critics led Americans to fear excessive government interference in their
own lives and "made civil liberties a national issue and led to the creation of a major watchdog
organization, the American Civil Liberties Union." Id.
38 See id. Supporters of conscientious objectors acknowledged the likelihood of future
wars and, further, that the desire to mobilize large groups of soldiers could lead to another
period of suffering and repression for objectors. See id. Supporters from a variety of faith-based
and secular groups began to work together to ensure that the experience of World War I would
not be repeated. See id. Rather than focusing on organizations that specifically supported
accommodation of conscientious objectors, these groups sought to ally themselves with
organizations focused on the promotion of peace and civil liberties, including the American
Civil Liberties Union and the War Resisters League. See id.
39 Id. After leaming of the negative experiences of many conscientious objectors during
World War I, Americans began to argue that the government had failed to ensure objectors'
ability to follow their beliefs. See supra Section Il.C. This same sentiment continued into the
World War H-era and is evidenced by a 1940 survey which reported that approximately 50% of
Americans supported the provision of exemptions from military service or the option to engage
in noncombatant service for conscientious objectors. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 36.
40 The statute exempted from combatant service a draftee "who, by reason of religious
training and belief is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Selective
Service Act of 1940, Pub L. No. 76-783, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889 (1940). Previously, this
exempt status had only been extended to members of the historic peace churches and thus,
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provide civilian alternative service rather than requiring them to serve in the
military. 41 However, this legislation did not shield all objectors from poor
treatment, including imprisonment, during World War II. Most of the five
thousand objectors imprisoned during the War were individuals who were
conscientiously opposed to war but failed to meet the statutory definition of
conscientious objector.42 During World War II and the majority of the Cold War
Era, the law's treatment of conscientious objectors remained largely the same as
that provided in the 1940 Selective Service Act.43
E. Accommodation during and after the Vietnam War
One historian remarked that "[t]he Vietnam War... posed the most dramatic
confrontation in American history between the government's demands for
military service and objection of individual citizens to war." 44 During the
members of other religious sects, including Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, could not achieve
conscientious objector status. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 32.
One group, comprised of pacifists, civil libertarians, and members of various religious
groups, had lobbied for an even broader statutory definition of "conscientious objector" which
would have extended the exemption to all sincere objectors including individuals whose pacifist
beliefs were secularly based. See id. at 36. Despite their efforts, the definition was not expanded
to cover secular conscientious objectors. See id. Army officials refused to exempt secular
conscientious objectors in part because of the fear that such an exemption "might shelter
communists and 'fifth columnists."' Id. at 36-37.
41 The draft law provided statutory conscientious objectors with the choice between
noncombatant service and the opportunity to do "work of national importance under civilian
direction." Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 § 5(g), 54 Stat. at 889. During World
War I, the American armed service was comprised of fifteen million men, the largest it had
been in the country's history. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 37. Ten million of these men had
been drafted. See id. Fifty thousand draftees qualified as conscientious objectors, the majority of
which performed noncombatant service, usually in the form of medical services. See id. Twelve
thousand "agreed to work without pay on such nonmilitary projects as soil erosion control,
reforestation, and agricultural experimentation in one of the seventy Civilian Public Service
(CPS) camps." Id One important difference between CPS camps and camps in which
conscientious objectors served during World War I was the fact that the CPS camps were
operated by the historic peace churches while the other camps were run by members of the
military who often treated objectors harshly. See id; supra note 36 and accompanying text.
However, many conscientious objectors disfavored CPS camps, and in 1946 use of the camps
was eliminated. Conscientious objectors were permitted to provide "individual rather than
collective alternative service." Chambers, supra note 20, at 38.
42 Among these individuals were secular conscientious objectors and Jehovah's Witnesses
whose pacifist beliefs were religiously based, but did not qualify because of their refusal to
apply for conscientious objector status, their demand for complete exemption so that they could
continue to preach, and their refusal to participate in alternative service. Chambers, supra note
20, at 38 n.66.
43 Id. at 38.
44 1d. at 39.
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Vietnam War, the number of individuals protesting the draft, and specifically, the
number of individuals claiming conscientious objector status, increased. 45 In
addition, a greater number of individuals began to protest the use of their tax
dollars to fund military activities and programs,46 and a number of organizations
were formed to advance their ideas. 47 The stage was set for major changes to be
made in the draft system and more specifically, in the way in which the
government regarded and treated conscientious objectors.
Congress enacted the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 to ensure that
conscientious objectors would not be compelled under American draft laws to
violate their beliefs and participate in war.48 The Act provides exemption to "any
person.., who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
45 See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 954. Historian John Whiteclay Chambers II calculated
the ratios of "men classified as conscientious objectors per 100 actual inductees" in the military
for each of the wars in which America participated during the twentieth century. Id. at 999
n.254. In World War I and II, he estimated that for every 100 actual inductees, 0.14 and 0.15
men, respectively, were classified as conscientious objectors. Id. The ratios greatly increase
during the Vietnam War. See id In 1967, he calculated that for every 100 actual inductees, 8.1
men were classified as conscientious objectors. Id. In 1971 and 1972, Chambers calculated that
for every 100 actual inductees, 42.62 and 130.72 men, respectively, were classified as
conscientious objectors. Id.
Those individuals drafted during the Vietnam War only comprised 16% of the total
military at this time. Chambers, supra note 20, at 39-40. However, the draftees made up over
50% of the American soldiers that died during battle. Id at 40. The amount of opposition to the
war, and specifically to the draft, increased as the number of draftees and the number of
casualties increased. Id. A draft resistance movement comprised of students, pacifists, religious
groups, civil rights advocates, feminists, and other liberal and radical groups surfaced as this
opposition grew. Id. The growing opposition that occurred as the Vietnam War progressed
provides a probable explanation for the increase in Chambers' ratios between 1967 and 1972.
See id. In addition, the increase in ratios between World War I and II and the Vietnam War and
the increase between 1967 and 1972 is attributable to the fact that two important Supreme Court
decisions had expanded the definition of "conscientious objector" to encompass secular
conscientious objectors provided that their beliefs were morally or ethically based. See Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); see also infra
note 50 and accompanying text.
46 Approximately 20,000 individuals protested the use of their tax dollars to fund the War
by refusing to pay their income taxes. Komhauser, supra note 1, at 954 n.57. In addition, an
estimated 200,000 people protested by withholding payment of their telephone excise taxes. Id.
4 7 Id. at 954. For example, the National Council for a World Peace Tax Fund and the
National War Tax Resistance are two organizations that were formed during the War. Id.
48 This statute is a relatively modem example of the government making the decision to
accommodate conscience. Despite the fact that this statute deals with an exemption from
military service, this Note will demonstrate that passage of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax
Fund Act is a constitutional and feasible extension of the accommodation provided to
conscientious objectors under this statute. See infra Sections V, VI, and VII.
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opposed to participation in war in any form." 49 The statutory language appears to
restrict conscientious objector status to individuals whose anti-war beliefs are
religiously based. Despite its apparent plain meaning, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the Act's exemption applies to both religious and secular conscientious
objectors. 50 Thus, the document distributed by the Selective Service to
individuals seeking the exemption, specifies that the "religious training and
belief' language "includes beliefs often thought of as ethical or moral in
nature."5
1
III. CURRENT STATE OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND WAR TAX
RESISTANCE
As the previous Section indicates, conscientious objectors today are exempt
from military service. 52 However, this accommodation alone is not enough to
ensure conscientious objectors the ability to live their lives in a manner consistent
with their pacifist beliefs. Rather, every April 15, conscientious objectors are
confronted with the difficult choice between remaining true to their beliefs by
refusing to pay taxes used to fund war, or fulfilling their civic duty to pay taxes,
and thereby violating their consciences. 53
War tax resisters' discontent with the use of their tax dollars has increased as
the amount of money allocated to military spending has increased. 54 The amount
49 The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1964 ed., Supp.
V).
50 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (holding that demonstration of a
belief in god is not needed to attain conscientious objector status provided that a "sincere and
meaningful belief' that is "parallel to that filled by... God" can be demonstrated); Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (concluding that conscientious objector status is available to
individuals whose anti-war beliefs are based in ethics or morals).
51 HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 49 (Arlo Tatum ed., 12th ed. 1972). The
Selective Service also emphasizes that "a man's reasons for not wanting to participate in a war
must not be based on politics, expediency, or self-interest. In general, the man's lifestyle prior to
making his claim must reflect his current claims." Selective Service System, Fast Facts:
Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service, at http://www.sss.gov/FSconsobj.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2003). Under the current system, an individual who qualifies for conscientious
objector status can be assigned to an "Alternative Service" job or will serve a noncombatant
function within the military. Id.
52 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
53 Some conscientious objectors make the decision to pay their taxes rather than to resist
payment. However, this Section focuses on the actions of objectors who do resist payment and
the penalties assessed against them because of this resistance.
54 See, e.g., National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, Sample Letter to Editor, at
http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003) ("Debate in Washington, D.C. centers
on tax cut percentages [and trillion dollar surpluses], yet little attention is paid to the gluttony of
military spending which is an affront to many conscientious objectors and peace activists
around the nation."); Kierans, supra note 43, at 10 (emphasizing the "damage" caused by
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of money allocated to military programs and activities by the Federal Budget for
Fiscal Year 2003, $369 billion, represents the largest increase in military spending
in twenty years. 55 The United States' military budget is far greater than that of
any other nation in the world.56 Thus, the United States not only allocates a much
larger amount of money to fund its military than any other country in the world,
but it has also chosen to increase this amount of funding.57 In terms of spending,
an estimated seventeen percent of tax dollars will be spent on national defense
during fiscal year 2003.58 In addition, more than half of American tax dollars are
average Americans' tax dollars as the amount of tax revenues allocated to fund the military
increases and urging taxpayers to "object to violence in [their] name[s]" and "to claim [their]
right to make a living as ... peaceful human being[s] in good conscience").
In addition to lobbying for allocation of their tax dollars to fund non-military programs,
some conscientious objectors also seek to decrease overall military spending. See, e.g.,
Advantages of a Peace Tax Fund, at http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
"The Peace Tax Fund Bill would be a meaningful step towards raising the national
consciousness about misplaced military priorities. The level of usage of the Peace Tax Fund
would be reported by Congress each year, and would serve as a measure of the nation's
conscience regarding the inhumanity of war." Id. However, the increase in the proportion of
total tax revenues used to fund the military is alarming to all conscientious objectors because it
makes the payment of taxes feel like an even greater violation of their consciences. See, e.g.,
Kierans, supra note 43, at 1, 10. The purpose of this Note is not to argue in favor of decreasing
military spending. Rather, the Note focuses upon and supports the accommodation of
conscientious objectors' beliefs through the enactment of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax
Fund Act. See infra Section IV. The references to the United States' military budget are
provided solely as background information.
55 Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2003 A Citizen's Guide to the Federal
Budget 7, available at http://www.mop-shop.org/Budget/cguide.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Citizen's Guide]. The increase represents a twelve-percent increase. Id. In addition,
"if the war against terrorism requires it," $10 billion more will be allocated for military
spending. Id. The Bush Administration is requesting $399.1 billion to fund the military in fiscal
year 2004. National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, Your Tax Dollars at Work, at
http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003) (quoting the Center for Defense
Information).
56 Christopher Hellman, Center for Defense Information, Last of the Big Time Spenders:
US. Military Budget Still the World's Largest, and Growing, February 4, 2002, at
http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersFY03.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003) (comparing
other nations' military budgets from 2001 to the Bush Administration's 2003 budget request,
$396.1 billion). For example, Russia, the country that allocates the second greatest amount to
fund its military, budgets $60 billion for this cause, only one-sixth the amount that the United
States budgets to fund its military. Id. In addition, recent figures show that the United States
military budget is greater than the combined budgets of the twelve countries whose allocations
are closest to the American military budget. Id. Heliman demonstrates that the twelve closest
countries' (including Russia, China, Japan, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) combined
budgets totaled approximately $310.7 billion as compared to the United States' $396.1 billion.
Id.
57 See Kierans, supra note 43, at 1.
58 Citizen's Guide, supra note 55, at 4.
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utilized for the funding of current and passed wars.59 The Bush Administration
intends to spend $2.7 trillion to fund military programs and activities over the
next six years.60
Conscientious objectors voice their discontent with this use of tax dollars to
fund the military in a multitude of ways. In 1990, the National War Tax Resisters
Coordinating Committee approximated that between 10,000 and 20,000
Americans withheld a portion of their tax dollars because they could not in good
conscience allow their tax dollars to be used to fund military endeavors. 61 In
addition, thousands of individuals are estimated to have made the decision to earn
incomes below the taxable level62 in order to avoid the choice between following
their beliefs and following the law.63
Such protestors often face great punishments for their objection. For example,
some have penalties assessed against them by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
and others are sentenced to jail time. 64 Penalties are assessed and interest is
charged to individuals who owe taxes but fail to file, and to individuals who file
59 Marketplace, supra note 3 (comments of Karl Manheim).
60 Your Tax Dollars at Work, supra note 55. President Bush contends that after September
11, 2001, an increased amount of money must be allocated to fund the military, in his words, to
"pay the cost of war and the price of transforming our Cold War military into a new 21st
Century fighting force," and to fund programs implemented by the Office of Homeland
Security. Citizen's Guide, supra note 55, at 1.
61 Komhauser, supra note 1, at n.75. The National War Tax Resisters Coordinating
Committee reached this conclusion based on a survey it conducted, information gathered from
other organizations, and its own mailing list. Id.
62 According to Steve Oleshewsky, an income of less than $600 per month would fall
below the taxable level. See Oleshewsky, supra note 4. He cites as an example a medical doctor
in Austin, Texas, who has "rented a small house, in an impoverished neighborhood, with a
roommate and no real furniture for about 20 years rather than allow one penny she has earned
helping people to be used for hurting people." Id.
63 See, e.g., Marketplace, supra note 3; Background to the Peace Tax Fund, supra
note 16.
64 See Background to the Peace Tax Fund, supra note 16. For example, Richard Ralston
Catlett, a Quaker pacifist, failed to file his tax returns and to pay his taxes and the corresponding
penalties and interest that had accumulated. As a result, the IRS seized his business.
Komhauser, supra note 1, at 941 n.6. Even after the seizure, Catlett refused to file his tax
returns and withheld tax payments. Id. Subsequently, he was imprisoned for two months and
placed on three years of probation after being convicted of willful and knowing failure to file.
Id.
The IRS has put liens on Timothy Pearce's property several times since he began to resist
paying his taxes in their entirety. Timothy Pearce, Peace Tax, TRIBUNE REVIEW, June 29, 2002,
available at http://library.triblive.com/interconnect/intercon.dll (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
Despite these penalties, Pearce continues to resist and states, "[o]f course, the threats of property
seizure and jail are scary, but my fear must be so much less than what people feel in countries
that are being bombed with weapons paid for by U.S. tax dollars." Id.
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but fail to pay the full amount of the taxes that they owe.65 Some conscientious
objectors pay the amount of taxes they owe less the amount that they calculate
would be allocated to fund military programs. 66 These individuals often donate
that amount to a charity or other non-military organization and include a receipt
or other document in their tax return explaining to the IRS why they have
withheld this money and what they have opted to do with these funds. 67
Individuals, including conscientious objectors, who file on time but fail to
pay the full amount of the taxes owed are required to pay a penalty, which
amounts to "one-half of one percent of the tax owed for each month, or part of a
month, that the tax remains unpaid from the due date, up to 25 percent." 68 In
addition, courts have consistently labeled objectors' claims that they are entitled
to conscience deductions or credits on their tax returns as "frivolous," 69 and have
permitted the IRS to assess a $500 civil penalty against these individuals for filing
frivolous income tax returns. 70 Individuals, including conscientious objectors,
65 I.R.S., Department of the Treasury, Topic 653-IRS Notices and Bills, Penalties and
Interest Charges, THE DIGITAL DAILY, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/taxtopics (last
visited Oct. 23, 2003).
66 See Ronald B. Flowers, Government Accommodation of Religious-Based Conscientious
Objection, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 695, 714 (1993).
67 See id. at 715; Kornhauser, supra note 7 and accompanying text (telling the story of
Randy Kehler and Betsy Comer, two conscientious objectors who sent in their tax returns with
a letter explaining that they had decided to contribute their tax dollars to charitable and peace-
promoting organizations rather then pay them to the federal government).
68 Topic 653-IRS Notices and Bills, supra note 65. If ten days pass after the IRS issues an
intent to levy against these individuals and they continue to withhold the delinquent amount,
this rate increases to one percent. Id.
69 The Internal Revenue Code provides for the assessment of a $500 penalty if:
(1) any individual files what purports to be a return of the tax imposed'by subtitle A but
which-
(A) does not contain information on which the substantial correctness of the self-
assessment may be judged, or
(B) contains information that on its face indicates that the self-assessment is
substantially incorrect; and
(2) [This conduct] is due to--
(A) a position which isfrivolous ....
26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
70 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 750 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that the
taxpayer's position was frivolous because no provision is made within American law for a
credit or deduction based on taxpayers' opposition to the use of tax dollars to fund military
programs and activities); Harper v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Drefchinski v. Regan, 589 F. Supp 1516 (W.D. La. 1984); John W. Wright, Note, Taxation:
Frivolous Tax Litigation: Pecuniary Sanctions Against Taxpayers and Their Attorneys, 39
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who owe taxes but fail to file on time are charged a late penalty, which amounts
to:
[F]ive percent of the tax owed for each month, or part of a month that [their]
return is late and the tax is unpaid, up to five months. The late file penalty
continues at 5% a month up to 25% on unpaid amounts. If [their] return[s] [are]
over 60 days late, the minimum penalty for late filing is the smaller of $100 or
100 percent of the tax owed.71
The amount of interest charged to individuals who fail to pay their income
taxes is assessed at a rate that equals the federal short-term rate plus three
percent.72 The amount of interest is compounded daily and continues to increase
until the delinquent taxpayer has paid the full amount of the taxes, penalties, and
interest charges owed.73 Individuals who continue to withhold their tax dollars are
contacted by the IRS and asked to voluntarily pay the full amount owed. 74 Failure
to do so enables the IRS to act by filing a lien against these individuals' property,
which provides the IRS with a legal right to the individuals' property as security
or payment for the amount owed, or by serving a levy on these individuals'
property or salary, which enables the IRS to take the property in full satisfaction
of the amount they owe.75
These collection actions often have an extremely adverse impact upon
individuals' lives.76 One conscientious objector, Patricia Washburn, withheld
$4000 of the amount of tax dollars she owed and donated it to non-military
OKLA. L. REv. 156, 160 (1986) (noting that "[m]oral or social objection to the payment of tax,
regardless of the basis on which presented to the courts, has been deemed frivolous.").
71 Topic 653-IRS Notices and Bills, supra note 65.
72 See id. The IRS re-calculates this interest rate every three months. See id. As a general
rule, the amount of interest owed by a tax dollar can never be waived, even if the taxpayer
claims that she has reasonable cause for her tardiness. See id.
73 See id.
74 Internal Revenue Service, United States Department of Treasury, What You Should
Know About the IRS Collection Process, Publication 594, at 5, 7, available at
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
Collection Process].
75 See id.; see also Komhauser, supra note 64 and accompanying text (telling the story of
a Quaker Pacifist whose business was seized after he failed to pay his income taxes and the
interest and penalties that had been assessed against him).
76 See, eg, Collection Process, supra note 74, at 7. Liens can hurt credit ratings making it
difficult, if not impossible, to attain loans or be approved for leases and credit cards. Id. at 7. A
levy enables the IRS to seize and sell property, including homes and cars, and to seize items
including salaries, funds held in bank accounts, and accounts receivables. Id. at 7. Some items
cannot be seized via IRS levies. Id at 10. These include workmen's compensation, child
support payments, unemployment benefits, household items up to $6,780, some articles of
clothing, and books used at school. Id. at 10.
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programs. 77 Interest and other penalties were assessed against Washburn, which
caused the $4000 to increase to $24,000 over time. 78 Washburn was unable to
satisfy this debt, and thus, the IRS repossessed her car and she was forced to sell
her home.79 Washburn was aware that the IRS would eventually receive their
$4000.80 By re-directing this amount from her tax payment she hoped to be taken
to court where she could explain the reasons for her decision to withhold the
amount.81 She never thought that her attempt to voice her opinion would result in
the loss of her home.82 However, this experience has not prompted Washburn to
pay income taxes; rather, she has made the decision to earn an income below the
taxable level so that she can legally avoid the obligation to pay taxes.83
IV. SUBSTANCE OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PEACE TAx FUND ACT
In 1958, for the first time, a bill was introduced in Congress that provided for
a peace tax fund.84 The bill, if enacted, would have enabled taxpayers to gain a
tax credit of no more than two percent if they donated money to the fund.85 The
money in the fund would have been used to assist poor nations throughout the
world.86 The origins of House Bill 2037, the current version of the Religious
77 Marketplace, supra note 3.
78 Id79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Marketplace, supra note 3.
83 Id. Former U.S. Senator Hatfield observed that Washburn actively supported and
worked to advance enactment of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act. Statements on
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 140 CoNG. REc. S7763 (1994) (statement of Sen.
Hatfield). Haffield concluded from this that Washburn "[c]learly ... wants to pay her taxes in
full." Id. This fact, taken in conjunction with her decision to live in poverty, makes it evident
that Washburn's focus was not to break the law, but rather to protest what she perceived as the
government's attempt to compel her to violate her conscience. See Marketplace, supra note 3.
Many objectors like Washburn "believe that supporting military service through taxation is no
different than fighting in war; each are equally unacceptable morally." Introduction of Bills and
Joint Resolutions and Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 137 CONG. REC.
S6,623 (1991) (comments of Sen. Hatfield). Thus, Washburn made the only decision that she
could-the decision not to violate her conscience.
84 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 985-86.
85 Id. at 986.
86 Id. The most current form of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act does not
propose a tax credit in exchange for a donation to the Fund. See H.R. 2037, 108th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2003), introduced May 8, 2003, available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Oct. 23,
2003). Rather, the current bill would place conscientious objectors' tax dollars into the Fund
and subsequently, the money from the Fund would be used to fund non-military programs and
activities. See infra Section IV.B.
1244 [Vol. 64:1229
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOMPEACE TAXFUND ACT
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, can be traced back to the World Peace Tax Fund
Bill, which was introduced in the House of Representatives for the first time in
1972.87 A similar piece of legislation has been proposed in each Congress since
1972.88
A. Who Qualifies as a Conscientious Objector?
The Act defines a conscientious objector using the same criteria as the
Military Selective Service Act. 89 Consequently, the Act would apply to "a
taxpayer who is opposed to participation in war in any form based upon the
taxpayer's deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs or training .... 9o
These individuals would then be required to "certifLy] these beliefs in writing to
the Secretary of the Treasury in such form and manner as the Secretary
provides." 91
The Act does not cover individuals who are opposed to particular wars as
opposed to all war, individuals who raise political objection to the United States'
fiscal policies in general or more specifically, military spending, and individuals
who selectively object to nuclear war or any war that could potentially become
nuclear war.92 Commentator Karl Manheim laments that the Act will open the
87 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 986.
88 Id. The most current version of the Act, H.R. 2037, was introduced in the House and
subsequently referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means. See National Campaign
for a Peace Tax Fund, Sample Letter to US. Senator, at http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last
visited Oct. 23, 2003). Representative John Lewis sponsored the Act and thirty-one other
representatives served as co-sponsors for the Act. Id The bill has not been introduced in the
Senate. Id.
As its reoccurring introduction into Congress illustrates, no version of the bill has ever
become law. In addition, Congress chose to take testimony about the bill only three times: in
1976, 1992, and 1995. See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 989. In 1976, a panel of individuals
testified about the World Peace Tax Fund during public hearings, and in 1992, the House held
extensive hearings during which a wide variety of supporters and critics testified as to the bill's
merits. Id. In 1995, the House Ways and Means Committee held less extensive hearings during
which a variety of proposed tax reforms, including the bill, were discussed. Id.
89 See, e.g., H.R. 2037 § 3(a); National Campaign for A Peace Tax Fund, Your Beliefs and
Military Taxes, at http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). The following are
questions, based on Selective Service Forms, that must be answered before an individual can
attain the status of conscientious objector: "Describe the beliefs which are the basis for your
claim as a [conscientious objector]"; "Describe how you acquired these beliefs"; "Describe how
your beliefs affect the way you live and the type of work you do." Id.
90 H.R. 2037 § 3(a).
91 Id.
92 See generally H.R. 2037. The Supreme Court has concluded that the conscientious
objector exemption in the Selective Service Act does not apply to those who object to only a
particular war; rather, the Act applies to those who oppose participation in all wars. See Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,447 (1971).
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floodgates by prompting individuals, whose beliefs lead them to protest a
particular war or object to certain ways in which military funds are spent, to
demand accommodation for their beliefs. 93 The definition of conscientious
objector contained in the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act addresses
Manheim's concern by utilizing the same definition as the Selective Service Act,
thereby refusing coverage to those who object to particular wars rather than
participation in all war, and those who raise political objection to military
spending programs. 94
B. Where Will the Money Go?
Enactment of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act would not relieve
conscientious objectors of their duty to pay taxes.95 The total amount of taxes
paid by these individuals would not change; rather, the way in which these dollars
are spent would be altered. 96 The Act proposes to amend the Internal Revenue
Code so that conscientious objectors' income, estate, and gift taxes would be
utilized solely for non-military purposes.97 The Act would create the Religious
Freedom Peace Tax Fund, a trust fund within the United States' Treasury, where
the full amount of conscientious objectors' tax dollars would be placed.98 The
Secretary of the Treasury would determine the way in which conscientious
objectors' tax dollars would be deposited into the Fund.99 The Treasury would
93 See Marketplace, supra note 3 (comments of Karl Manheim). Manheim asks:
Can you imagine if a group of Muslims decided they didn't want their tax dollars going to
support foreign aid or military aid to Israel or a group of Jews, saying they didn't want our
dollars going to military or foreign aid for the Arab countries [based on their deeply held
religious beliefs]?
Id.
94 In terms of Manheim's example at note 93, the group of Muslims that objects to the use
of their tax dollars as military funding or foreign aid for Israel would not be covered under the
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, because these individuals do not meet the bill's
definition of conscientious objectors.
95 See e.g., Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 131 CONG. REC.
S19,601 (1985) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). Senator Hatfield noted that enactment of the
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act would "not serve to lessen tax burdens for a
specialized interest group, but instead allow[ people who are barred by their conscience to pay
Federal taxes to once again join the ranks of law-abiding citizens." Id.
96 H.R. 2037; See also Background to the Peace Tax Fund, supra note 16.
97 H.R. 2037 § 4(a); See also Background to the Peace Tax Fund, supra note 16.
98 H.R. 2037 § 4(a).
99 Id. The text of the Bill provides that the money will be deposited "in a manner that
minimizes the cost to the Treasury and does not impose an undue burden on such taxpayers."
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then allocate the money within the Fund to any non-military purpose. 100 The
following activities and programs are deemed military purposes under the Act,
and thus would no longer be funded by conscientious objectors' tax dollars if the
Act becomes law:
[T]he Department of Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National
Security Council; the Selective Service System; activities of the Department of
Energy that have a military purpose; activities of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration that have a military purpose; foreign military aid; and the
training, supplying, or maintaining of military personnel, or the manufacture,
construction, maintenance, or development of military weapons, installations, or
strategies. 10 1
The Act also provides that any growth in the revenue amassed by the United
States Treasury as a result of the implementation of the Fund "shall be allocated
in a manner consistent with the purposes of the Fund." 102
100 Id. In contrast, H.R. 1402, a version of the Bill introduced in Congress during 1995,
would have enabled conscientious objectors to "appropriate the peace tax funds to programs
including the supplemental food program for women, infants and children (WIC), Head Start,
the United States Institute of Peace, and the Peace Corps." Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without
Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555, 569 (2002).
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that "[t]he Treasury [would have] distribute[d]
the funds in accordance with congressional appropriations" and that "[t]otal appropriations to
the military as well as to nonmilitary programs [would] have not changed at all." Komhauser,
supra note 1, at 988. Komhauser made these comments in reference to the 1999 version of the
bill; however, these comments equally apply to H.R. 2037, the 2003 version of the bill, because
the language of these two bills is identical. See H.R. 1454, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2037,
108th Cong. (2003). The following example illustrates that total military appropriations would
not have been altered if the bill had been enacted:
Assume that there are only two taxpayers, A and B, each paying $100 in taxes. Also
assume that thirty percent of the budget goes to the military. Without the peace tax fund,
$60 will go to the military (presumably $30 from each taxpayer), and $140 will go to
nonmilitary spending ($70 from each taxpayer). If A directs that her tax dollars should go
to the peace tax fund, the Treasury still receives $200 total with $60 going to the military
and $140 to nonmilitary expenditures. The only difference is that $60 of B's money goes
to military, leaving only $40 of her taxes for nonmilitary expenditures because all of A's
tax dollars go to nonmilitary spending.
Id.
101 National Campaign For a Peace Tax Fund, There Ought to be a Law, at
http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
102 H.R. 2037 § 4(d).
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V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PEACE TAx FUND
A. The Peace Tax Fund is Not a Constitutionally Mandated
Accommodation
The majority of war tax resisters have unsuccessfully defended their position
by arguing that the income tax violates their First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion. 10 3 By forcing them to pay a tax that is used to fund military
endeavors and subsequently requiring them to pay penalties and accrued interest
when they fail to pay this tax, conscientious objectors argue that the government
is depriving them of their rights to freely exercise their religion and conscience. 104
Despite the frequency with which these claims are made, challenges to tax
based on the Free Exercise Clause usually fail. 105 Courts have broadly 10 6
interpreted Congress's constitutionally granted power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises" 107. Great deference is granted to statutes dealing
with revenue because of the recognition that the continued existence of the
government depends upon generation of revenue via a sound system of
taxation. 108
For similar reasons, courts usually defer to Congress's power to tax when a
First Amendment challenge is waged against it. 10 9 The Supreme Court has
103 See Flowers, supra note 66, at 695; Komhauser, supra note 1, at 960. In addition,
objectors have unsuccessfully asserted claims based on the Religious Freedom and Restoration
Act of 1993 by arguing that passage of this Act evinced a Congressional desire to craft
accommodations for conscientious objectors' beliefs within the income tax laws. See
Komhauser, supra note 1, at 960, 967-72 (discussing claims based on the Religious Freedom
and Restoration Act of 1993 and the courts' responses to these claims).
Conscientious objectors have also argued, unsuccessfully, that payment of income tax
violates their "international human rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion." Id.
at 960. (Komhauser notes that the most common of these international law claims argues that
paying taxes, and thus, funding the government's military endeavors, indirectly "subject[s]
them to individual liability for war crimes," and cites examples of cases in which these claims
have been asserted, and explains the reasons that courts have used to deny these claims.). Id. at
973-82; see also Rosa Covington Packard, Letter from the UN, in PEACE TAX FUND
QUARTERLY UPDATE, Issue I, at 11 (2002) ("The United States courts have not yet...
admitt[ed] arguments that the United Nations has recognized conscientious objection as a
human right.").
104 See Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 961.
105 Id at 962.
106 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 963.
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
108 Id.
109 Id. However, in a few cases, the Supreme Court has struck down tax statutes as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
112 (1943). However, the situation in Murdock was unique because the tax statute at issue
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determined that the government has the right to require employers to withhold
social security taxes from their employees' earnings and to require employers to
pay the employer portion of social security taxes even though such payments
conflict with some employers' religious beliefs.1 10 In United States v. Lee, the
Court stated that limitations on religious freedom are constitutional when they are
"essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." II1 The Court
identified an overriding governmental interest in upholding a uniform system of
taxation in order to provide the country with needed revenues and specifically, in
the context of the social security tax, revenues needed for a "comprehensive
insurance system with a variety of benefits available to all participants ... ,112
The Court also noted that Americans possess a wide variety of distinct religious
beliefs. 113 Making accommodations for these beliefs within the tax system would
be a very onerous task, one that courts state would undermine the ability of the tax
system to function. 114 Consequently, the Court concluded that "[t]o maintain an
organized society ... some religious practices [must] yield to the common
good."1 5 In communicating this conclusion, the Court noted that paying social
imposed a limited, specific tax and application of that tax jeopardized the constitutional right to
free speech in addition to the right to free expression. Id.
110 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). Lee is applied in almost all income tax
cases to uphold tax statutes. See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 963.
111 Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58. In Lee, an Amish employer argued that his adherence to the
requirements of the Social Security System would violate his religious beliefs, which
"prohibit the acceptance of social security benefits, but also bar[] all contributions by the
Amish to the social security system." Id. at 255. Requiring him to comply with these
regulations would constitute a violation of his rights under the Free Exercise clause. Id. at 254-
56. The Court concluded that the requirements of the social security system do, in fact, interfere
with the ability of the Amish to exercise their religious beliefs. Id. at 257. However, the Court
emphasized that the inquiry does not end here but continues in order to determine whether "an
overriding governmental interest" exists to justify this interference with religious freedom. Id at
257-58.
112 Id. at 258.
113 Id. at 259.
114Id. at 260.
115 Id. at 259. However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens took a different view.
He stated, "[t]he Court overstates the magnitude of [the risk of making an accommodation in
this case] because the Amish claim applies only to a small religious community with an
established welfare system of its own." Id at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring). "The Amish claim is
readily distinguishable from the typical claim... [In the typical case the taxpayer is not in any
position to supply the government with an equivalent substitute for the objectionable use of his
money. "Id. at 262 n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' basic rationale can be utilized
in support of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act. In lobbying for enactment of the Act,
its supporters, like the Amish in Lee, provide the government with an "equivalent substitute,"
the creation of a Fund into which all qualifying objectors' tax dollars shall be placed and
subsequently, from which only non-military programs and activities will be funded. See supra
Section IV.
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security taxes is not fundamentally different from paying income taxes. 116
Specifically, the Court cited the example of individuals with anti-war beliefs and
stated that the tax system could not be maintained if such individuals were
allowed to challenge it because revenues were used to fund war-related
endeavors. 1 17
The courts continue to cite Lee in their denials of challenges on the tax
system which are based on the Free Exercise Clause. 118 The Supreme Court has
gone so far as to state that even a substantial burden on the freedom of exercise is
justified by the overriding public interest in maintaining a uniform system of
taxation, one that does not accommodate the wide variety of religious beliefs held
by Americans. 119 The Court instituted a new standard in the context of these
cases when it stated that the Free Exercise Clause "does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
116 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982); see infra note 119 and accompanying
text (discussing the Hernandez case, in which the Court squarely addresses a constitutional
challenge to a provision in the federal income tax code).
117 Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
118 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 965-66.
119 See, e.g., Hemandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989). In Hernandez,
members of the Church of Scientology sought to deduct payments that they had made to
branches of the Church for "auditing" and spiritual training as charitable contributions on their
federal income tax returns. Id. at 684-86. These individuals argued that failure to recognize
these payments as charitable contributions constituted a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
by "'placing a heavy burden on the central practice of Scientology."' Id. at 698 (citation
omitted). The Court cited Lee in holding that failure to allow deduction of these payments as
charitable contributions did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 698-700. The Court
doubted that the failure to allow these deductions constituted a substantial burden because
"[t]his burden is no different from that imposed by any public tax or fee; indeed, the burden
imposed by the denial of the 'contribution or gift' deduction would seem to pale by comparison
to the overall federal income tax burden on an adherent." Id. at 699 (citation omitted). However,
the Court emphasized that any burden, even a heavy one, would be justified by the "'broad
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system,' free of 'myriad exceptions flowing from a
wide variety of religious beliefs."' Id. at 699-700 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned that
making an exception in this specific case would open the floodgates to a multitude of requests
for other exceptions based on religious beliefs. See id. at 700. If exceptions occurred in all these
cases, the ability of the government to maintain the country's system of taxation would be
significantly undermined. Id.
The Court also labeled as immaterial the fact that Lee involved the Social Security System,
while this case dealt with federal income taxes. See id. at 700. The government's interest in
refusing an exception in this case may actually be stronger than in Lee because the exception
sought in this case "stems from the contention that an incrementally larger tax burden interferes
with their religious activities," whereas "the claimed exemption in Lee stemmed from a specific
doctrinal obligation not to pay taxes .... ." Id. According to the Court, a floodgate problem
would be more likely if exceptions were permitted in every situation in which a group made a
claim like the one raised in Hernandez. See id.
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applicability .... 11,120 In Smith, the Court stated that application of strict scrutiny
analysis should be limited to cases in which some other right, in addition to the
right of free exercise, is implicated.12'
The Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution does not mandate
accommodation of war tax resisters' claims under the Free Exercise Clause.
However, this does not preclude Congress from creating legislation that would
provide this accommodation as long as that legislation does not violate the
Establishment Clause. 122 The Supreme Court has approved of, and even
endorsed, these permissive accommodations based on its conclusion that such
accommodations are virtual necessities in a society characterized by religious
freedoms. 123 Congress has utilized its power to create permissive
accommodations on many occasions. 124 Consequently, the inquiry into the
constitutionality of the Fund should not end here; thus, the next section will
consider whether this permissive accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
B. The Peace Tax Fund is a Constitutionally Permissive Accommodation
The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act does not violate the
Establishment Clause. 125 The reasons that can be offered in support of this
conclusion are similar to the reasons that the Supreme Court advanced in Gillette
v. United States 126 to reach the conclusion that the conscientious objector
exemption contained in the Military Selective Service Act does not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 27
120 Dep't. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (citing Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Scholars argue that institution of a new standard
does not undermine the viability of the Lee decision and support this argument by asserting that
the Smith decision, as well as other decisions in the area of tax and non-tax areas, is replete with
citations to Lee. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 965-66.
121 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. Appellate courts vary in the ways in which they interpret
and apply the Smith decision. See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 962.
122 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 967.
123 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (concluding that Oregon is not constitutionally
required to accommodate the religious beliefs of Native Americans by permitting their
sacramental ingestion of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, while emphasizing that Arizona,
Colorado, and New Mexico statutes allowing sacramental ingestion of peyote constitute
constitutionally permissive accommodations).
124 See, e.g., § 1402 of FICA, which exempts self-employed individuals from mandatory
participation in the social security system of taxation. 26 U.S.C. § 1402 (2000). Also, Congress
chose to exempt conscientious objectors from service in military combat when it passed § 6(j)
of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1964 ed. Supp. V).
125 See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
126 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
127 Id. at 448-60.
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In Gillette, a draftee who failed to report for induction into the military and a
member of the armed services seeking discharge challenged the constitutionality
of the exemption contained in the Military Selective Service Act. 128 The men
claimed that construing the exemption to apply only to individuals who objected
to participation in all wars unconstitutionally infringed upon the First Amendment
rights of those individuals who were conscientiously opposed to particular
wars.129 However, the Court did not accept this argument. Rather, the Court ruled
that the exemption is constitutional for several reasons. First, the exemption, on its
face, does not provide special treatment to any particular religion. 130 The
exemption applies to all individuals conscientiously opposed to all war, regardless
of the type of religious beliefs underlying that conscientious opposition. 131
Application of the exemption is not, for example, restricted to Christian
conscientious objectors.
Second, the Court stated that the exemption advanced secular purposes
"having nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or cluster
of religions."' 32 The Court identified two secular purposes that were furthered by
the exemption. First, the Court identified that a sincere conscientious objector is
likely to make a very poor solider and thus, resources would likely be wasted in
attempting to transform such a person into an effective fighter.133 In addition, the
Court noted that the exemption reflects the idea that "'in the forum of conscience,
duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been maintained."' 134
The constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act should
be upheld for similar reasons. The Act, like the exemption of conscientious
objectors from military combat, advances secular purposes. First, like the
conscientious objector exemption in the Military Selective Service Act, the
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act reflects the secular notion that duty to
one's conscience reigns supreme and would further reflect an appreciation of the
difficulty a conscientious objector faces every April 15 when she must decide
between comporting with federal income tax law and following the dictates of her
128 Id. at 448.
129 Id.
13 0 Id. at 450-51. The Court stated that "[t]he specified objection must have a grounding
in 'religious training and belief,' but no particular sectarian affiliation or theological position is
required." Id.
131 Id. at 450.
132 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971).
133 Id. at 452-53.
134 Id. at 453 (citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting)). The Court also stated that the exemption evinced an appreciation of the difficult
decision that would face a drafted conscientious objector and, in addition, to shield the objector
from having to make a choice between comporting with the law and remaining true to his
conscience. Id.
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conscience. 135 In addition, enactment of the Peace Tax Fund would advance the
secular and pragmatic purpose of increasing the amount of revenue generated by
the IRS while simultaneously decreasing the IRS's collection costs by
encouraging conscientious objectors to pay their taxes. 136 In so doing, the Fund
would not provide special treatment to religious groups; rather, the Fund would
accommodate conscientious objectors who are opposed to the use of their tax
dollars for military spending on both religious and secular grounds. 137
Next, implementation of the Fund would not lead to excessive government
entanglement in religious matters. Treasury officials are concerned that the Fund
would cause the IRS to become excessively entangled in religious matters
because it would require the IRS to determine who meets the statutory definition
of a "conscientious objector." 138 The IRS's role in the identification process
would be the same as the Selective Service's role in identifying conscientious
objectors for purposes of applying the Military Selective Service Act's
exemption. 139 In the years since the adoption of this exemption, the Selective
Service's identification role has not been categorized as creating excessive
government entanglement in religious matters. 140 Furthermore, the IRS may only
be called upon to play this identification role when it conducts audits, 141 and thus
any government involvement would be better categorized as rare and minimal
than as excessive.
135 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
136 Extension of Remarks: Peace Tax Fund Bill Deserves Support, Comments of George
E. Brown Jr., 138 CONG. REC. 12,349, (1992) (statement of George E. Brown) (asserting that
the Act would have the benefit of "reducing the present administrative and judicial burden
caused when conscientious objectors feel forced to violate tax laws rather than violate their
consciences .... [T]he Internal Revenue Service will be able to collect full taxes from
conscientious objectors without difficulty and added cost and strain on the judicial system.").
"[I]ncome taxes from individuals supply the biggest portion of revenues for the U.S.
Treasury .... [Bly its very nature, government is dependent on [its citizens]." Citizen's Guide,
supra note 55, at 3-4. Consequently, legislation that would encourage individuals to pay their
income taxes, and thus increase the total revenues generated by the IRS, would provide the
government with greater resources to utilize in its operation.
137 See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 996.
138 See, e.g., id. at 997.
139 See supra Section IV.A.
140 Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 996.
141 See id. at 1001. The IRS may only be called on to play this role when it conducts
routine audits because the need to "police claimants" would be small, in part, because taxpayers
would have no financial incentives to disingenuously assert conscientious objector status. Id.;
see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. See generally infra Section VI.A (providing
suggestions on how to improve the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act to help ensure that
if it was enacted, it would not be exploited by the disingenuous).
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VI. CRITICISMS OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PEACE TAX FUND BILL
The supporters of the Peace Tax Fund include a multitude of private
individuals within the United States, over 150 organizations, 142 and more than
fifty members of Congress. 143 Of those who support the Peace Tax Fund,
including members of Congress, not all are conscientiously opposed to war.144
On an international level, countries and international organizations have
demonstrated an interest in protecting the rights of conscientious objectors to
follow their beliefs rather than be compelled to follow laws that directly violate
those beliefs,' 45 and many countries 14 6 have "active Peace Tax Campaigns" of
their own. 14 7 Despite the support for the Peace Tax Fund within the United States
and throughout the world, there are also critics of the Fund.1 48 This section will
outline and respond to several of these arguments. In doing so, it will provide
additional support for the Fund beyond the constitutional support that was
established in the prior section.
142 The organizations that support the Peace Tax Fund Bill include the following:
American Friends Service Committee, American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Baptist
Peace Fellowship of North America, Brethren in Christ Church, Buddhist Peace Fellowship,
Church of the Brethren, Disciples of Christ, Episcopal Peace Fellowship, Fellowship of
Reconciliation, Friends Committee on National Legislation, General Board of Church and
Society of the Methodist Church, General Conference Mennonite Church, Grandmothers for
Peace, Jewish Peace Fellowship, Lutheran Peace Fellowship, Mennonite Central Committee
Peace Section, Mennonite Church, National Assembly of Religious Women, National
Federation of Priests Councils, New Call to Peace Making, Pax Christi (U.S.A.), Presbyterian
Church U.S.A., Presbyterian Peace Fellowship, Sojourners, Unitarian Universalist Association,
United Church of Christ, U.S. Catholic Conference (Office of International Peace and Justice),
Veterans for Peace, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and World
Peacemakers. National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, Campaign Fact Sheet, at
www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
143 See generally Background to the Peace Tax Fund, supra note 16.
144 See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 940 n. 1. For example, Andy Jacobs, a member of the
House of Representatives, was one of the main supporters of the Peace Tax Fund Bill even
though he previously worked as a Marine and served his country in Korea. See id.
145 See Campaign Fact Sheet, supra note 142. Poland, Russia, Hungary, and Brazil have
enacted legislation that protects the rights of conscientious objectors. See id. In addition, the
United Commission of Human Rights in 1989 acknowledged the legitimacy of conscientious
objectors' beliefs. See id.
146 Among these nations are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. Id.1471Id
148 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 997-101 l(explaining and responding to the
administrative, policy-oriented, and floodgates arguments asserted by critics of the Act,
including the Treasury Department).
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A. The Peace Tax Fund Will Not be Exploited by the Disingenuous
The most current form of the Act, H.R. 2037, would apply to designated
conscientious objectors, meaning taxpayers who are "opposed to participation in
war in any form based upon the taxpayer[s'] deeply held... beliefs or training...
and who have certified these beliefs in writing to the Secretary of the Treasury in
such form and manner as the Secretary provides."' 149 Some critics fear that
allowing conscientious objectors to assert their status through the provision of a
mere personal statement of beliefs would provide non-conscientious objectors
with an incentive to exploit this accommodation.' 50 They fear that as the number
of people who claim the exemption increases, the amount of funds available for
military spending would decrease. 151 If this results, the IRS would be forced to
allocate a greater number of its limited resources to auditing individuals to discern
whether they are true conscientious objectors. 152
One way to eliminate these concerns in a manner that is compatible with the
2003 version of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act would be to change
the process by which objectors assert their status so that it is more involved and
thus, less amenable to false claims. 153 For example, a fee could be attached to
149 H.R. 2037 § 3(a).
150 Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality-Institutions ofAmelioration, 67 VA.
L. REv. 177, 208 n.77 (1981). For example, this process would enable individuals who dislike
war, but whose beliefs do not reach the level of conscientious objection, to make the easy and
more comfortable decision to re-route their tax dollars to fund non-military endeavors. In
addition, those who advocate change, in the long-term, in the way government spends tax
dollars, could take advantage of this process to promote their political agendas. These
individuals would hope that a large number of participants in this program would send the
message to the government that Americans desire a change in the way tax dollars are spent.
These concerns are similar to those expressed by American government leaders in
response to the possibility of exempting conscientious objectors from combatant service during
World War I. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
151 See Marketplace, supra note 3 (comments of Karl Manheim); Komhauser, supra note
1, at 997-98.
152 See Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 997-98; see also infra Section VI.B. (addressing and
disposing of concerns that the Fund would result in the imposition of a large administrative
burden upon the IRS).
153 The 2003 version of the Act states that money would be deposited into the Fund "in a
manner that minimizes the cost to the Treasury and does not impose an undue burden on such
taxpayers." H. R 2037 § 4(a); see supra note 99 and accompanying text. Arguably, the "undue
burden" language within the Act does not foreclose the possibility of assessing a fee provided
that the fee, particularly the amount of the fee, is not unduly burdensome. Id. Also, the Act's
language emphasizes that while it is permissible to place a burden on the taxpayer, any burden
or cost to the government in transferring money into the fund must be minimized. See H.R.
2037 § 4(a). The Act envisions the possibility, and even desirability, of shifling some of the
burden to the individual taxpayer rather than requiring the government to absorb it. See H.R.
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each application for conscientious objector status. 15 4 Attaching a cost would
discourage the disingenuous from participating in the program. 155 In terms of
another potential safeguard, Senator Hatfield noted, in reference to the 1985
version of the Peace Tax Fund Bill, that "[t]he IRS will no longer be required to
challenge a conscientious objectors' claim [in a federal court] .... Instead, the
burden of proof... now falls upon the claimant."'1 56 Thus, it would be possible to
incorporate within the Act a provision that requires the claimant to bear the
burden of proving her case rather than requiring the IRS to expend its resources in
defending its conclusion that she does not qualify for the exemption. This
provision would also serve as a deterrent to disingenuous individuals seeking to
exploit the Fund.157
B. The Fund Would Not Place a Large Burden upon the IRS
Critics, including Treasury officials, are concerned that implementation of the
Fund would require the IRS to expend time and money flying to determine which
purported conscientious objectors possess sincerely held beliefs. 158 According to
these officials, the fact that the Act defines conscientious objectors in the same
§ 4(d). However, the 2003 version of the Act does not expressly provide for the assessment of a
filing fee. See generally H.R. 2037.
154 Greenawalt, supra note 150, at 208 n.77.
155 1d.
156 131 CONG. REC. S19,601 (1985) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
157 Critics also fear that special interest groups interested in affecting change in the
country's spending policies will disingenuously claim conscientious objector status, or
encourage others to do so are unfounded. See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 1002. Special interest
groups are not likely to allocate resources to encourage individuals to claim conscientious
objector status on their tax returns for a couple reasons. See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 1004.
First, implementation of the Peace Tax Fund is extremely unlikely to make a sizeable difference
in the amount of tax dollars that are available to fund military programs. Id. Consequently,
special interests groups would have little incentive to spend their time and money encouraging
Americans to claim conscientious objector status because of the small amount of monetary
change that would result from subtracting conscientious objectors' tax dollars out of the money
allocated for military funding. See id
Furthermore, special interest groups would have a difficult time sending their message to
Americans due to the fact that Americans pay their taxes at different times despite the yearly
April 15th deadline. Id. Individuals pay their taxes at a variety of times including months before
the April 15th due date, days or weeks prior to the date, and in some cases, individuals who
attain extensions pay after this date has passed. Id Conscientious objectors would make the
decision to allocate their tax dollars to the Fund when they file their returns and because this
event can occur at extremely different times for different individuals, special interest groups
would have great difficulty sending a message that all tax payers would be receptive to. Id.
158 Id. at 997; But see supra Section V.B. (arguing that the Fund is a constitutionally
permissive accommodation, in part, because implementation of the Fund would not lead to
excessive government involvement).
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way as the Military Selective Service Act does not lessen the IRS's burden
because it is difficult to discern who qualifies as a conscientious objector under
the Military Selective Service Act. 159
However, the burden imposed on the IRS by the Fund is likely to be minimal
for several reasons. First, history shows that the Military Selective Service Act's
criteria for identifying conscientious objectors are effective. The Act's exemption
has been repeatedly, and successfully, utilized during wars to enable
conscientious objectors an alternative to active combat. Thus, in a practical sense,
it has not been difficult to discern who qualifies as a conscientious objector under
the Act.160 Additionally, any burden imposed upon the IRS is likely to be light
given the relatively small number of individuals estimated to utilize the Fund if it
is implemented.' 61 Only an estimated 150,000-250,000 households are likely to
utilize the Fund.' 62 Furthermore, as the previous section indicates, the Act could
place the onus upon the claimant to substantiate her pacifist beliefs rather than
requiring the IRS to defend its determination that the individual did not meet the
statutory requirements for conscientious objector status. 163
C. Implementation of the Fund Will Not Undermine Democratic Values
nor Will It Provide Conscientious Objectors with an Unfair Advantage
Some commentators argue that despite the positive attributes of the Fund,
implementation of the Fund would undermine the democratic system upon which
our country was founded and has thrived since its inception. 164 Tax officials
object to implementation of the Fund on the grounds that it would provide
objectors an advantage over other Americans. 165 According to these officials,
citizens of a representative democracy do not exert direct influence in making
governing decisions, including the way tax dollars are spent; rather, citizens elect
15 9 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 998.
160 See id. at 999.
161 Id. at 999-1000. The Act provides no economic incentives to individuals to make false
claims. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. This would be particularly true if the
suggestion to assess claimants a filing fee was implemented. See supra notes 153-55 and
accompanying text.
It is important to note that the pool of conscientious objectors that would be eligible for
exemption under the Act would be larger than the pool of conscientious objectors that are
eligible for exemption under the Military Selective Service Act because the former group
includes men and women and people of all ages unlike the latter group. However, in a
theoretical sense, the incentive to fabricate a false claim is greater when one's life is at stake
than it is in a scenario in which one's life is not endangered and there is not even an economic
incentive to fabricate. See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 999.
162 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 999.
163 See supra notes 156-57 and the accompanying text.
164 See Marketplace, supra note 3 (comments of Gene Steuerle).
165 See Staudt, supra note 100, at 569.
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officials who represent their interests when making these decisions. 166 Officials
argue that the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act gives conscientious
objectors an advantage by allowing them to play a more direct role in the decision
making process than other Americans who can only exert their influence through
voting and other political processes. 167 These critics emphasize that conscientious
objectors' inability to directly influence the way in which tax dollars are spent
does not leave them without options. 168 They can "organize and lobby, [they] can
earn less and pay less taxes, or [they] can give bigger sums to charity and
take ... tax deduction[s]."' 169 Withholding funds from the IRS or attempting to re-
route their tax dollars from military programs is not effective because of the state
of the law, and because it fails to promote the democratic ideals upon which this
country was founded. 170
In response to these criticisms it must be acknowledged that American
government is not purely a representative democracy in which citizens only
exercise their influence in an indirect fashion by voting for officials whose beliefs
are similar to their own. 171 Rather, direct voting, through initiatives and referenda,
is common within this country, especially within the taxation arena. 172 In
addition, implementation of the form 1040 check off for the Presidential Election
Campaign on federal tax returns illustrates a willingness to enable citizens to
make direct decisions about how their tax dollars are spent. 173 This check off is
different from the Peace Tax Fund in that it permits citizens to direct a much
smaller amount of their tax dollars: three dollars as opposed to the entire
amount.174 However, the election check off actually represents a greater departure
from representative democracy. 175 The check off enables citizens to direct their
money to a very specific cause whereas the Fund only enables conscientious
objectors to direct their funds to a very general category of activities and
programs. The objector has no say in the specific way in which those funds will
166 See id.
167 Id.; Miscellaneous Tax Bills and the Peace Tax Fund- Hearing on H.R. 65, HR. 1733,
HR. 1870 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 102d Cong. 61 (1992) (Statement of Terrice Hyde, Tax Legislative Counsel,
Department of Treasury).
168 See, e.g., Marketplace, supra note 3 (comments of Gene Steuerle).
169 Id. In fact, Steurle argues that conscientious objectors actually make a bigger impact
when they make charitable donations than when they attempt to keep their money out of the
IRS's reach. Id.
170 See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 1003-04.
171 See id. at 1003.
172 See id. at 1003-04.
173 See id. at 1005.
174 See id
175 See id
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be spent. Rather, she knows only that her money will be used to fund non-military
programs, of which there are many.
Furthermore, officials from the Treasury are concerned that the Act would
give conscientious objectors an advantage over other Americans by enabling
them to have a direct say over the way in which their tax dollars are spent. 176
According to these officials, allowing conscientious objectors to have this
privilege would encourage other groups of Americans to request the same
privilege for their groups. 177 These groups would demand the power to redirect
their tax dollars away from government programs they disapprove of in order to
fund programs that they deem acceptable.
In response, proponents of the Fund argue that:
The plight of those who object to military taxes on the basis of deeply held and
universally recognized teachings is on a higher moral plane than objections
based on mere political, social or economic preference. As such the Peace Tax
Fund Bill will not open the door to other exceptions. 178
With the passage of the exemption contained in the Military Selective Act of
1967, Congress identified the importance of accommodating conscientious
objectors rather than forcing them to make the choice between violating their
beliefs and breaking the law. 179 Clearly, this country cannot accommodate every
citizen's desires or preferences; however, the government has communicated that
accommodation of conscience is not only a possibility, but a priority.180 Also, the
government, via the Supreme Court's decision in Gillette, has established limits
on this accommodation.' 81 The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act asks for
nothing more than a logical extension of the treatment bestowed upon
conscientious objectors with the creation of the exemption from military service.
Finally, the very nature of the decision made by conscientious objectors,
whether to allocate their tax dollars to military or non-military programs, is very
different from decisions that other tax payers may want to have the power to
make, such as whether to allocate their tax dollars to education or housing
programs. 182 The former decision is between two broad entities, while the later
176 See supra note 167 and the accompanying text.
177 See Komhauser, supra note 1, at 1003.
178 National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, Advantages of a Peace Tax Fund, available
at http://www.peacetaxfund.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
179 See The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1964 ed.
Supp. V).
180 See, eg., Flowers, supra note 66, at 734-35 (1993). Not only does this country make
accommodation a priority, but specifically, as Flowers observes, "th[is] country has a long
tradition of accommodating conscience." Id. (emphasis added).
181 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
182 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 1004.
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decision is between two very narrow entities and thus, the two are not equivalent.
"Moreover, [the decision between military and non-military] is probably one of
the most basic choices a voter could make," 183 whereas the decision between
education and housing is very complex.
VII. PRACTICALITIES OF IMPLEMENTING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PEACE
TAx FuND ACT
Economic benefits rather than detriments would result from implementation
of the Act. The passage of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act would not
inhibit the government's ability to fund military activities and programs, despite
increases in the amount of money allocated for military spending by the federal
budget.184 Rather, in 1992 and 1994, the Joint Committee on Taxation stated that
implementation of the Fund would benefit the United States Treasury by
increasing the amount of revenues generated through the income tax. 185
Moreover, the Fund would also benefit the economy by encouraging the tens of
thousands of war tax resisters who intentionally earn less than the taxable level to
earn to their full capacity and thus, increase their incomes. 186 The Peace Tax
Fund would also have the effect of decreasing the amount of time and money
expended by the IRS in collecting delinquent payments from conscientious
objectors and enable the IRS to focus on solving other collection problems.' 87
The economic feasibility associated with implementing the Peace Tax Fund
is particularly attractive in light of the benefits that would accrue from passage of
the Act. The Act would enable war tax resisters to follow their deeply held
religious and humanitarian beliefs and to fulfill their civic duty to pay taxes. 188
183 Id.
184 See supra note 100 and accompanying text; Citizen's Guide, supra note 55, at 7.
"[There] is [an] extremely small probability.., that contributing to the fund would make an
actual difference in the ultimate appropriations to the military." Komhauser, supra note 1, at
1004.
185 See H.R. 2037 § 2(5). Senator Hatfield, a strong supporter of the Act stated that "if
enacted, [it] would allow complete participation in our Federal Government by all citizens
without many being forced to compromise deeply held beliefs of any citizen." 142 CONG. REC.
S7161 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
186 Marketplace, supra note 3.
187 See, e.g., Advantages of a Peace Tax Fund, supra note 178; Komhauser, supra note 1,
at 1011. Kornhauser argues that the IRS would generate more income if it was able to focus on
other collection problems because conscientious objectors tend to be low-income producers. Id188 See Marketplace, supra note 3 (comments of Karl Manheim). This decision is
particularly difficult because it leaves conscientious objectors with no legal alternative to
violating their consciences by paying their taxes. See, e.g., Peace Taxpayers, Legality, available
at http://www.peacetax.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). The government does not prevent these
individuals from acting in a particular manner; rather "the government affirmatively compels
them to take actions that violate their beliefs .... ." Komhauser, supra note 1, at 1013. This
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The Fund would provide a practical solution to the problem caused when
objectors have to make a choice between these two important responsibilities.
Passage of the Act would not provide conscientious objectors with special
treatment nor would it absolve them from their civic responsibilities; and thus, it
would simultaneously benefit conscientious objectors, the federal government,
and the American people. 189
Furthermore, this accommodation is feasible in light of traditional American
values. 190 Governmental actions, including exempting conscientious objectors
from military combat 191 and expanding the definition so that it applies to religious
and secular conscientious objectors, illustrate a willingness to accommodate
beliefs rather than to compel violation of those beliefs. The exemption contained
in the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 provides individuals who are
conscientiously opposed to war with an altemative way to serve their country
during a time of war instead of requiring them to participate in active combat. 192
The Act does not absolve conscientious objectors from their duty to serve their
country. 193 Rather, the Act provides these individuals with the option to serve
their country in a way that does not violate their religious or moral beliefs about
war. Any person meeting the Act's definition of conscientious objector
"shall ... be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or
shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such
noncombatant service,.., be ordered.., to perform... civilian work
contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest .... 194
Like the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, the Selective Service Act,
redirects "resources" in a way that accommodates the government's significant
interests and the conscientious objectors' beliefs. Furthermore, in the taxation
arena, Congress has also protected the rights of individuals who oppose social
security taxes on religious grounds by approving an exception from payment of
these taxes for self-employed individuals.195
affirmative compulsion serves to distinguish this scenario from other cases in which the Court
has identified the existence of infringement upon the free exercise of religious and moral
beliefs, but held that the infringement did not reach the level of unconstitutionality and thus, did
not warrant accommodation of those beliefs. Id.
189 Komhauser, supra note 1, at 1011-13.
190 See id (discussing the accommodations, in the form of exemptions from combatant
service, that conscientious objectors have been granted throughout American history).
191 See id; see, e.g., The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560)
(1964 ed. Supp. V).
192 The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1964 ed., Supp.
V). The Act states that no person shall be subject to "service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form." Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (2000).
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Tax resisters' confidence in this country's system of taxation and in the IRS
would also increase.1 96 In addition, society's confidence in the income tax system
would increase upon enactment of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund
Act.197 Many individuals who are not opposed to the use of tax dollars to fund
military programs sympathize with conscientious objectors' position and view the
seizure of conscientious objectors' property and other penalties as unfair
treatment. 198 Consequently, accommodation of conscientious objectors' beliefs
would be viewed as fair and reasonable treatment and thus, increase societal
confidence in the tax system and the IRS.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund is a constitutional and practically
feasible way to accommodate the beliefs of conscientious objectors and to
simultaneously provide economic benefit to the United States. The concerns of
conscientious objectors are amplified in the wake of the war in the Middle East,
the United States's continued occupation of Iraq, and continued involvement in
the affairs of countries throughout the world. Clearly, the United States faces
enemies outside its boundaries. The Peace Tax Fund provides this country with
an opportunity to avoid creation of enemies within its boundaries by
accommodating conscientious objectors in a way that enables them to follow the
law while following their beliefs.
196 See Komhausersupra note 1 at 1012.
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1981Id
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